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By Joshua D. Blank
I. Introduction
U.S. tax law has historically endeavored to prevent
the use of the tax-free spin-off transaction as a device
to convert ordinary income into capital gain. Under
section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code (the code),1 a
spin-off is denied tax-free treatment if “principally
used as a device for the distribution of the earnings
and profits of the distributing corporation or the con-
trolled corporation or both.”2 The device test under
section 355 is designed to thwart shareholders’ at-
tempts at extracting earnings and profits of a distribut-
ing corporation (Distributing) at capital gains rates
without diminishing their ownership interest in Dis-
tributing.3 For example, an individual shareholder
receiving shares of a corporation controlled by Dis-
tributing (Controlled) in a taxable distribution recog-
nizes income as though he received a dividend
(generally at ordinary income rates); in a tax-free spin-
off, on the other hand, an individual shareholder can
effectively convert that ordinary income into gain
taxed at long-term capital gains rates by disposing of
the Controlled stock in a taxable sale or exchange after
its distribution. As ordinary income rates have tradi-
tionally been higher than long-term capital gains
rates,4 tax-free spin-offs have offered an attractive
means of “bailing out” earnings and profits at capital
gains rates.5
Recent legislative changes, however, have dramati-
cally altered the tax rate landscape in which the device
test operates. Under the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2003 (the 2003 Tax Act),6 in-
dividual shareholders are taxed on qualified dividends
and long-term capital gains realized on the sale of cor-
porate stock at the same maximum rate, 15 percent,
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This article explores the impact of the Jobs and
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 on
the policy concerns underlying the section 355
“device test” for tax-free spin-offs. Under the 2003
legislation, individual shareholders generally are
taxed on both qualified dividends and long-term
capital gains realized on the sale of corporate stock
at the same maximum rate — 15 percent. Unifica-
tion of these rates appears to neutralize the tradi-
tional concern that taxpayers may use a tax-free
spin-off as a “device” to transform ordinary in-
come into capital gains. This article examines the
relevance of the device test in this new unified rate
environment. The article concludes that the device
test should not be repealed completely, but that,
during periods of unified rates, application of the
device test should be limited and is not necessary
when individual shareholders hold their shares in
the distributing and controlled corporations with
zero basis.
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1All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as amended, unless otherwise indicated.
2Section 355(a)(1)(B).
3See Part III of this article for a discussion of the policy
rationale underlying the device test.
4For example, in 2002, individuals in the top federal mar-
ginal tax bracket were taxed on ordinary taxable income at a
rate of 38.6 percent, but were taxed on long-term capital gains
on the sale of stock at a maximum rate of 20 percent.
5See Howard E. Abrams and Richard L. Doernberg, Federal
Corporate Taxation 250 (1998) (“All in all, if given a choice,
taxpayers prefer lower taxes to higher taxes”).
6The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2003, Pub. Law 108-27, 108th Cong. 1st Sess. (2003).
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provided that statutory requirements are met.7 Unifica-
tion of these rates appears to neutralize the govern-
ment’s concern that individual shareholders will abuse
the spin-off provisions to transform ordinary income
into capital gains. The 2003 Tax Act now taxes an in-
dividual shareholder who receives Controlled stock in
a tax-free spin-off (and later recognizes a long-term
capital gain by selling that Controlled stock) at the
same rate as an individual shareholder who receives
the Controlled shares in a taxable distribution.
Whereas a tax-free spin-off previously could have
enabled some individual shareholders to recognize in-
come at a potential tax rate of 20 percent (tax rate on
long-term capital gain) instead of 38.6 percent (highest
marginal tax rate on ordinary income), the 2003 Tax
Act establishes a 15 percent tax rate for individual
shareholders regardless of whether the spin-off is tax
free or taxable. Thus, as several commentators have
recently questioned, in this unified rate environment,
is the device test still relevant?8
As several commentators have
recently questioned, in this unified
rate environment, is the device test
still relevant?
This article explores the impact of the unification of
individual dividend and long-term capital gains rates
on the policy concerns underlying the device test. The
article concludes that despite the significant changes
made by the 2003 Tax Act, the device test should not
be repealed completely. The article cautions, however,
that during periods of unified rates, application of the
device test should be limited and is not necessary when
individual shareholders hold their Distributing and
Controlled shares with zero basis.
The structure of the article is as follows: Part II ex-
plains briefly the requirements for a tax-free spin-off
under section 355; Part III examines the operation and
underlying rationale of the device test; Part IV explores
the impact of unified dividend and long-term capital
gains rates on the policy concerns underlying the
device test; Part V presents alternatives to the device
test as a result of the 2003 Tax Act; and Part VI is the
conclusion.
II. Requirements for a Tax-Free Spin-Off
A spin-off is the distribution by a corporation to its
shareholders of the stock of a subsidiary corporation
that it controls.9 Congress initially provided for tax-free
spin-offs because those transactions theoretically rep-
resented mere changes in the form of shareholders’
interests.10 Wary that overly broad provisions under
the code could lead to abuse, Congress provided that
a spin-off must satisfy the following requirements
before receiving tax-free treatment under section 355:
Distributing must distribute a “controlling” amount of
stock of Controlled to its shareholders;11 immediately
after the distribution, Distributing and Controlled each
must be engaged in an active trade or business;12 a
spin-off must be motivated by one or more corporate
business purposes;13 and last, a spin-off must not be
used principally as a device to distribute earnings and
7Id., sections 301(a) and 302(a).
8See, e.g., Martin D. Ginsburg and Jack S. Levin, Mergers,
Acquisitions and Buyouts para. 1006 (June 2003 ed.)(“Query
how much sense the device test makes after 2002 with both
qualified dividend income and [long-term capital gain] taxed
to individual shareholders at the same 15 percent top rate”);
Robert Rothman, “Back to the Bog: The IRS’s New Policy on
Spin-off Rulings,” 30 Corp. Tax’n 5 (September/October
2003)(“[T]he elimination of the rate differential between cap-
ital gain and dividend income for individual taxpayers
reduces the potential shareholder-level benefit of a bailout,
and hence also should reduce the likelihood of a device. It
remains to be seen how the IRS will deal with the effect of
JGTRRA [(the 2003 Tax Act)] on the device restriction”).
9Tax-free distributions under section 355 are also referred
to as “split-offs” and “split-ups.” A split-off occurs when Dis-
tributing distributes Controlled stock to redeem a portion of
outstanding Distributing stock on a non-pro rata basis. A split-
up occurs when Distributing holds no assets other than the
stock of two subsidiaries and liquidates, distributing the stock
of the two subsidiaries to its shareholders.
10As a reaction to abusive spin-off transactions, such as
that illustrated in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935),
Congress repealed the tax-free spin-off provisions in 1934.
See H.R. 7835, Pub. Law No. 216, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1934).
It later reinstated the provisions in 1951, however, reasoning
that “it is economically unsound to impede spin-offs which
break up businesses into a greater number of enterprises,
when undertaken for legitimate business purposes.” S. Rep.
No. 781, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), 1951-2 C.B. 458, 459.
11Section 355(a)(1)(D). “Control” consists of at least 80 per-
cent of the voting stock and 80 percent of each other class of
stock of Controlled. Id. Section 355 applies the control test as
defined in section 368(c). If Distributing retains any stock of
Controlled, it must demonstrate that it has not retained the
stock as part of a plan to avoid federal income tax. Section
355(a)(1)(D)(ii).
12Section 355(b)(2)(B). These businesses must have been
conducted actively for the five years preceding the spin-off
and can not have been acquired as a result of a wholly or
partially taxable acquisition. To qualify as engaging in an
active trade or business, a corporation generally should per-
form active substantial management and operational func-
tions. Treas. reg. section 1.355-3(b)(2)(iii).
13In the past, the Service ruled that the following corporate
business purposes for conducting a spin-off satisfied the re-
quirement under section 355: increasing access to capital;
improving competitive position; realizing significant cost
savings; resolving “fit and focus” conflicts; protecting one of
Distributing’s businesses from the risks associated with
another of its businesses; and enabling Distributing to retain
a key employee.  See Rev. Proc. 96-30; 1996-1 C.B. 696, Doc
96-11987 (83 pages), 96 TNT 80-9, Appendix A for a full
description of the Service’s requirements for a private letter
ruling regarding business purpose under Rev. Proc. 96-30.
Recently, the Internal Revenue Service effected a major
change in ruling policy by announcing that it will no longer
issue private letter rulings regarding the business purpose
requirement of section 355. See Rev. Proc. 2003-48, 2003-29
IRB 86, Doc 2003-15249 (10 original pages), 2003 TNT 122-4.
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profits of Distributing or Controlled.14 Congress recent-
ly added two additional requirements for tax-free treat-
ment. First, a spin-off will not satisfy section 355 if,
immediately after the distribution, any shareholder
owns at least 50 percent (by either voting power or
value) of the stock of either Distributing or Controlled
and this stock was acquired in a taxable transaction
within five years before the distribution.15 Second,
under section 355(e), a spin-off cannot be part of a plan
or series of related transactions designed to enable one
or more persons to acquire a 50-percent-or-greater in-
terest in Distributing or Controlled.16
If a spin-off satisfies the requirements described
above, both Distributing and its shareholders enjoy
tax-free treatment.17 If a spin-off fails the requirements
of section 355, Distributing may recognize gain equal
to the excess of the fair market value of the Controlled
stock distributed over Distributing’s adjusted tax basis
in that stock, and its shareholders may be treated as
receiving dividend income.
III. The Device Test: Operation and Rationale
The device test has been the centerpiece of the tax-
free spin-off provisions for over 50 years. Its operation
and rationale are discussed below.
A. Operation of the Device Test
A spin-off will not qualify for tax-free treatment if
“used principally as a device for the distribution of the
earnings and profits of the distributing corporation or
the controlled corporation or both.”18 The mere fact,
however, that after the distribution some or all of the
stock of Distributing or Controlled is sold or exchanged
in a taxable transaction “other than pursuant to an
agreement negotiated or agreed upon prior to such
distribution”19 does not necessarily mean that the spin-
off was principally used as a device. As will be dis-
cussed in more detail, the driving concern behind
Congress’s passage of the device test was that without
the requirement, shareholders could extract earnings
and profits from a corporation at preferable long-term
capital gains rates.
Whether a spin-off is a device under the Treasury
regulations is determined based on “all facts and cir-
cumstances”20 relevant to the transaction. The Treasury
regulations adopt a balancing approach that weighs
enumerated “device factors” against “nondevice fac-
tors” to determine whether a spin-off is a device.21 The
Treasury regulations also specify transactions that will
“not ordinarily” be considered a device.22
The Treasury regulations consider the presence of
any of the following device factors as evidence that a
spin-off is a device:
Pro rata distribution. A distribution that is pro rata
or substantially pro rata to Distributing’s shareholders
is evidence of a device. The Treasury regulations com-
ment that the pro rata distribution of Controlled shares
to Distributing’s shareholders “presents the greatest
potential for the avoidance of the dividend provisions
of the code and, in contrast to other types of distribu-
tions, is more likely to be used principally as a
device.”23
Subsequent sale or exchange. Any subsequent sale
or exchange of the Controlled stock distributed in the
spin-off , regardless of whether prearranged, is
evidence of a device.24 The Treasury regulations pro-
vide that the greater the percentage of stock sold, and
the sooner it is sold after the distribution, the greater
the evidence of a device.25 A sale of Controlled stock
or securities after the distribution pursuant to a “prear-
ranged” sale is “substantial evidence of a device.”26
Nature and use of assets. The Treasury regulations
deem the presence of assets not used in an active trade
or business (including cash and other liquid assets in
14Section 355(a)(1)(B).
15Section 355(d).
16Section 355(e). If the acquisition occurs two years before
or after the spin-off, there is a presumption that the spin-off
is part of a plan. According to the Treasury regulations, a
“plan” under section 355(e) is limited to scenarios in which
the distributing corporation, its recently spun-off subsidiary,
or the shareholders of the distributing corporation intended
that an acquisition occur after the spin-off. Safe harbors and
operating rules are also provided in these Treasury regula-
tions. See Treas. reg. sections 1.355-7T(b)-(f).
17Section 355(a)(1). As an alternative to a tax-free spin-off,
Distributing may also ensure the availability of capital gains
treatment to its individual shareholders by making a dis-
tribution in partial liquidation of Distributing’s business (as
provided under section 302(b)(4)). Rather than attempting to
satisfy the requirements of section 355, Distributing could
liquidate an operating subsidiary, sell the subsidiary’s assets
for cash, and distribute the proceeds to its shareholders in
redemption of the shareholders’ Distributing shares. If these
proceeds are attributable to a “genuine contraction” of
Distributing’s business, the distribution yields capital gains
treatment (and tax-free bas is recovery in the shares
redeemed) for an individual distributee shareholder in sub-
stantially the same manner as a tax-free spin-off followed by




20Treas. reg. section 1.355-2(d)(1).
21Id.
22Id.
23Treas. reg. section 1.355-2(d)(2)(ii). A taxpayer can over-
come this device factor, however, by demonstrating that a
strong corporate business purpose motivates the spin-off.
See, e.g., Treas. reg. section 1.355-2(d)(4), example 2; Pulliam
v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. 3052, Doc 97-17875 (27 pages), 97 TNT
117-15 (1997) (Business purpose for spin-off of providing key
employee with equity interest overcame presence of device
factors).
24Treas. reg. section 1.355-2(d)(2)(iii).
25Treas. reg. section 1.355-2(d)(2)(iii)(A).
26Treas. reg. section 1.355-2(d)(2)(iii)(B). The Treasury reg-
ulations clarify that an exchange of the distributed Con-
trolled shares pursuant to a reorganization in which no gain
or an insubstantial amount of gain is recognized is not treated
as a subsequent sale or exchange. Treas. reg. section 1.355-
2(d)(2)(iii)(E).
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excess of reasonable business needs) of either Dis-
tributing or Controlled as evidence of a device.27
The Treasury regulations also list several factors that
are considered evidence that a spin-off is not a device.
These nondevice factors are weighed against the device
factors:
Corporate business purpose. The presence of a
legitimate corporate business purpose motivating a
spin-off is evidence of a nondevice. The Treasury reg-
ulations state that the stronger the device factors, the
stronger the corporate business purpose needed to
avoid the determination that the spin-off is a device.28
The Treasury regulations thus clearly link the device
test and the business purpose requirement for tax-free
treatment under section 355.
Publicly traded and widely held. Evidence of a
nondevice also exists if Distributing’s stock is publicly
traded and no single shareholder is directly or indirect-
ly the beneficial owner of more than 5 percent of any
class of Distributing stock.29
Distributions to corporate shareholders. A spin-
off demonstrates evidence of a nondevice if Controlled
stock is distributed to one or more corporate share-
holders that, absent section 355, would be entitled to
the 100 percent dividends received deduction under
section 243(a)(2), 243(a)(3), or 245(b) or to the 80 per-
cent dividends-received deduction under section
243(c).30
In addition to the device and nondevice factors, the
Treasury regulations specify that the following trans-
actions ordinarily will not be considered a device
(despite the presence of any device factors described
above):
Absence of earnings and profits. A spin-off will
not ordinarily be considered a device if, at the time of
the distribution of Controlled stock, neither Distribut-
ing nor Controlled has current or accumulated earn-
ings and profits.31 Further, for this exception to apply,
Distributing must hold no property that, if distributed,
would cause gain recognition that would result in earn-
ings and profits for the year of the distribution.32
Section 302(a) or 303(a) treatment. A spin-off will
also not ordinarily be considered a device if, absent
section 355, the distribution would have enabled share-
holders to receive sale or exchange treatment under
section 302(a) (redemption treated as sale or exchange)
or 303(a) (distribution in redemption to pay death
taxes).33
The Service recently announced in Rev. Proc. 2003-
48 that it will no longer issue private letter rulings on
whether a proposed spin-off satisfies the device test.34
Instead, a taxpayer requesting a ruling that a proposed
spin-off satisfies the requirements of section 355 must
submit the following representation: “The transaction
is not used principally as a device for the distribution
of the earnings and profits of the distributing corpora-
tion or the controlled corporation or both.”35 The Ser-
vice warned that it will decline to issue private letter
rulings on the tax-free status of proposed spin-offs “in
all cases in which the taxpayer fails to submit the re-
quired representation.”36 Before the release of Rev.
Proc. 2003-48, the Service would issue device rulings,
provided that the taxpayer submitted a series of repre-
sentations.37 For example, for public companies, a tax-
payer was required to submit a representation that no
5 percent shareholders had any plan or intention to sell
or dispose of the stock of Distributing or Controlled
after the distribution.38 A corporate taxpayer also pre-
viously had the opportunity to explain any special cir-
cumstances indicating evidence of a nondevice.39 In
contrast to the old ruling policy, the new policy pro-
hibits the Service from considering “all facts and cir-
cumstances” when applying the device test to par-
ticular spin-off ruling requests.
B. Policy Concerns and Rationale
The legislative history of section 355 strongly indi-
cates that Congress’s purpose in enacting the device
test was to prevent shareholders from converting ordi-
nary income into capital gain. Further, the Treasury
regulations under section 355, as well as taxpayer
guidance issued by the Service, attempt to dissuade
taxpayers from exploiting the tax-free spin-off provi-
sions to avoid dividend treatment.
The policy underlying the device test can be il-
lustrated by the following simple example applying the
tax rates in effect before enactment of the 2003 Tax Act.
27Treas. reg. section 1.355-2(d)(2)(iv)(A).
28Treas. reg. section 1.355-2(d)(3)(ii).
29Treas. reg. section 1.355-2(d)(3)(iii).
30Treas. reg. section 1.355-2(d)(3)(iv). It should be noted
that the Treasury regulations do not include, as evidence of
a nondevice, a distribution to a corporate shareholder that,
absent section 355, would be entitled to the 70 percent divi-
dends-received deduction under section 243(a)(1).
31Treas. reg. sections 1.355-2(d)(5)(ii)(A), (B).
32Treas. reg. section 1.355-2(d)(5)(ii)(C).
33Treas. reg. section 1.355-2(d)(5)(iii), (iv). This presump-
tion does not apply, however, if the distribution is of the stock
of two or more controlled corporations and allows share-
holders to avoid dividend treatment by selling or exchanging
the shares of one controlled corporation while retaining the
stock of the other controlled corporation. Treas. reg. section
1.355-2(d)(5)(v), example 2.
34Rev. Proc. 2003-48, 2003-29 IRB 86, note 13 supra.
35Id., section 4.02(1).
36Id.
37See Rev. Proc. 96-30, note 13 supra.
38Id., section 4.05(1)(a) (“There is no plan or intention by
any shareholder who owns 5 percent or more of the stock of
the distributing corporation, and the management of the dis-
tributing corporation, to its best knowledge, is not aware of
any plan or intention on the part of any particular remaining
shareholder or security holder of the distributing corporation
to sell, exchange, transfer by gift, or otherwise dispose of any
stock in, or securities of, either the distributing or controlled
corporation after the transaction.”).
39Id., section 4.05(1)(c)(iii).
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Example 1. Shareholder A owns 100 shares of Dis-
tributing as a capital asset. On January 1, 2002, Dis-
tributing separates its businesses through a pro rata
tax-free spin-off. Shareholder A receives 100 shares of
Controlled stock as a result of the spin-off distribution.
On May 1, 2002, Shareholder A sells his Controlled
shares to a third party for $100 cash and is taxed at a
rate of 20 percent on his long-term capital gain40 result-
ing from the sale. If Shareholder A had received the 100
Controlled shares in a taxable distribution, however,
he would have been taxed at the applicable ordinary
income rate of 38.6 percent on the fair market value of
the Controlled shares distributed as a dividend (assum-
ing that Distributing had sufficient earnings and
profits). The tax-free spin-off treatment thus enabled
Shareholder A to pay tax at a rate of 20 percent on his
gain from his sale of Controlled shares, whereas taxable
dividend treatment would have required him to pay
tax at a rate of 38.6 percent on the fair market value of
the Controlled shares received.
The legislative history of section 355
strongly indicates that Congress’s
purpose in enacting the device test
was to prevent shareholders from
converting ordinary income into
capital gain.
The legislative history of the tax-free spin-off provi-
sions emphasizes that Congress’s rationale in enacting
the device test was to prevent such conversion oppor-
tunities. Congress was heavily influenced by the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Gregory v. Helvering.41
Holding that Mrs. Gregory (a distributee shareholder)
had willfully arranged for the distribution of ap-
preciated property through a tax-free spin-off, the
Court described Mrs. Gregory’s spin-off as nothing
more than “a mere device which put on the form of a
corporate reorganization.”42 The abuses highlighted in
the Gregory decision motivated Congress’s temporary
repeal of the tax-free spin-off provisions in 1934.43
Congress enacted the current version of the device
test as part of the Revenue Act of 1954.44 Congress was
justified in its concern that shareholders might be
tempted to use tax-free spin-offs to take advantage of
capital gains rates — in 1954 the maximum long-term
capital gains tax rate for individuals was 25 percent,45
and the maximum marginal ordinary income tax rate
for individuals in the top income bracket (more than
$400,000) was 91 percent.46 The House of Repre-
sentatives in its report on the spin-off provisions noted
that “[t]here is ample evidence . . . that closely held cor-
porations may undertake these transactions solely in
the hope of distributing earnings to shareholders at
capital gains rates.”47 The House bill even provided
that, regarding a spin-off of a controlled corporation
that incurred part of its income from “inactive” (that
is, investment) sources, distributee shareholders sell-
ing Controlled stock would be taxed at ordinary in-
come rates if they disposed of the stock within 10 years
of the distribution. The House report stated that “a new
and effective safeguard to preclude the transformation
of ordinary income into capital gain is contained in the
requirement of your committee’s bill that any disposi-
tion of such stock (within 10 years of its receipt) by the
shareholder . . . will give rise to ordinary income con-
sequences.”48 The Senate rejected the 10-year rule
proposed by th e House,  but  inc luded sect ion
355(a)(1)(B) (the device test) in its version of the bill.49
In the conference committee a small number of House
conferees succeeded in adding language to the device
test providing that the mere fact that shareholders sell
Distributing or Controlled shares after a tax-free dis-
tribution under section 355 would not necessarily
mean a spin-off is a device.50 With that proviso, the
device test was enacted and has remained largely un-
altered since 1954.51
The Service has also described Congress’s intent un-
derlying the device test as aimed at preventing the
transformation of ordinary income into capital gains.
In Rev. Rul. 71-383,52 the Service ruled that a spin-off
was not a device because if stock in the controlled
corporation had been distributed in a taxable distribu-
tion, the shareholders receiving that stock would have
been treated as receiving a substantially dispropor-
tionate redemption under section 302(b)(2) (resulting
in sale or exchange treatment of the distribution to the
recipient shareholders). The Service therefore held that
“the transaction is not a device to distribute earnings
and profits (that is, to convert ordinary income into
capital gains).”53 In addition, several celebrated judi-
40Shareholder A “tacks” the holding period of his Distribut-
ing shares to the holding period of his Controlled shares under
section 1223(1).
41293 U.S. 465 (1935).
42Id. at 468.
43See H.R. 7835, Pub. L. No. 216, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1934). In 1951, however, after successful lobbying efforts by
corporate constituents, Congress reinstated the provisions by
adding section 112(b)(11) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939. See Revenue Act of 1951, H.R. 4473, Pub. Law No. 183,
82nd Cong. 1st Sess. (1951), section 317.
44See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, H.R. 8300, Pub. Law
No. 591, Chapter 736, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1954).
45See Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Policy, Cap-
ital Gains and Taxes Paid on Capital Gains for Returns With Posi-
tive Net Capital Gains, 1954-2000 (Nov. 19, 2002).
46Internal Revenue Code of 1954, H.R. 8300, Pub. Law No.
591, Chapter 736, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1954).
47H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83rd Cong. 2nd Sess. (1954).
48Id.
49See S. Rep. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1954).
50See H.R. Rep. No. 2543, 83rd Cong. 2nd Sess. 38 (1954)
(Conference Report).
51For an excellent description of the legislative history of
section 355 and the device test, see generally Charles S. Whit-
man III, “Draining the Serbonian Bog: A New Approach to
Corporate Separations,” 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1194 (1968).
52Rev. Rul. 71-383, 1971-2 C.B. 180.
53Id.
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cial opinions have expressed similar logic regarding
application of the device test.54
The Treasury regulations under section 355 general-
ly interpret the device test as a legislative mechanism
for preventing bailout of earnings and profits at capital
gains rates. The introductory paragraph to the Treasury
regulations regarding the device test states that “[s]ec-
tion 355 recognizes that a tax-free distribution of the
stock of a controlled corporation presents a potential
for tax avoidance through the subsequent sale or ex-
change of stock of one corporation and the retention of
stock of another.”55
In addition to this general introductory language,
the Treasury regulations’ examples of “transactions not
ordinarily considered as a device”56 imply that the gov-
ernment’s objective is to impose the device test on
transactions that possess the potential for conversion.
For example, the Treasury regulations provide that a
spin-off is not ordinarily considered a device when
Distributing and Controlled have no current or ac-
cumulated earnings and profits, and Distributing holds
no appreciated property that would result in earnings
and profits if distributed57 — an extremely rare con-
fluence of facts.58 The logical explanation for this ex-
ception is that the absence of earnings and profits
means a tax-free spin-off could not enable shareholders
of Distributing to convert ordinary income into capital
gain. If a corporation with no current or accumulated
earnings and profits distributes Controlled shares to
its shareholders in a taxable distribution, the share-
holders enjoy sale or exchange treatment on receipt of
the shares.59 The Treasury regulations characterize this
transaction as not ordinarily considered a device be-
cause the distributee shareholders are taxed at capital
gains rates in either a taxable distribution or a tax-free
spin-off scenario.
Likewise, the Treasury regulations ordinarily will
not consider a spin-off to be a device if section 303(a)
(distribution in redemption to pay death taxes) or sec-
tion 302(a) (redemption treated as a sale or exchange)
would have applied to a distributee shareholder in a
taxable distribution. In each case, the distributee share-
holder would have enjoyed sale or exchange treatment
on receipt of the Controlled stock.60 If the Treasury
regulations had not carved out these transactions, they
would have treated spin-offs under these circum-
stances as abusive, even though capital gains treatment
results in all cases.
It should be noted that the Treasury regulations in-
clude the cautionary statement that “a device can in-
clude a transaction that effects a recovery of basis.”61
As a result of this provision, even if a taxable distribu-
tion of Controlled shares would have otherwise
resulted in capital gains treatment, a spin-off may con-
stitute a device if it provides a shareholder tax-free
recovery of his basis in his Controlled shares. This
surprising result is discussed in greater detail in the
next part of this article.
IV. The Device Test After Rate Unification 
The differential between ordinary income and capi-
tal gains rates was dramatically affected by the 2003
Tax Act. One of the key changes presented by the 2003
Tax Act is the reduction in individual rates on long-
term adjusted net capital gain on the sale or exchange
of capital assets such as corporate stock from 20 percent
to 15 percent.62 The 2003 Tax Act applies the new 15
percent rate to long-term capital gain recognized on
the sale or exchange of capital assets after May 6, 2003,
and before January 1, 2009.63 Concurrent with the
reduction to the long-term capital gains rate, the 2003
Tax Act provides that qualified dividend income
received by an individual shareholder from domestic
and qualified foreign corporations64 is taxed at the
54See, e.g., Comm’r v. Wilson, 353 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1965) (the
court commented that “Congress early learned, however, that
shareholders would select the part of the assets of an original
corporation which could most readily be converted into cash
or its equivalent, spin off those parts into the second corpo-
ration, distribute the stock in that corporation to themselves,
and thus have available for sale and capital gains tax treat-
ment the stock in that corporation, though in fact what they
sold represented accumulated earnings of the original corpo-
ration, which earnings, if they had been paid directly to the
shareholders of the original corporation, would have been
fully taxable to them as dividend income”); Rafferty v. Comm’r,
452 F.2d 767 (1st Cir. 1971) (spin-off treated as a device because
“once the stock was distributed, it could potentially be con-
verted into cash without impairing taxpayers’ equity inter-
est”); Gada v. U.S., 460 F. Supp. 859 (1978) (a device exists
where “the possibility of the shareholder abstracting accumu-
lated earnings at capital gains rates is present”).
55Treas. reg. section 1.355-2(d)(1).
56Treas. reg. section 1.355-2(d)(5).
57Id.
58See, e.g., Martin D. Ginsburg and Jack S. Levin, Mergers,
Acquisitions and Buyouts para. 1006.3 (June 2003 ed.) (“As a
practical matter, however, [Distributing’s] ability to take ad-
vantage of this rule is limited to circumstances in which
[Distributing] has no (appreciated) property that would give
rise to current E&P if it were distributed at the time of the
distribution of the [Controlled] stock”); Mark J. Silverman,
et al., “Operation of the Device and Active Business Require-
ments of the Section 355 Regs,” 70 J. Tax’n 324 (June 1989)
(“Given this last requirement, the viability of this provision
as a safe harbor to the device restriction is effectively
eliminated — almost every corporation has at least one ap-
preciated asset”).
59Section 301(c)(3).
60Section 303(a); section 302(a).
61Treas. reg. section 1.355-2(d)(1).
62The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2003, Pub. Law 108-27, 108th Cong. 1st Sess. (2003), section
301.
63Id., section 303.
64A “qualified foreign corporation” is a corporation that is
(a) incorporated in a possession of the United States or (b)
eligible for benefits of a comprehensive income tax treaty
with the United States that includes an exchange of informa-
tion program. Id.
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same rates that apply to net capital gains.65 This pro-
vision applies to qualified dividends received after
December 31, 2002, and before January 1, 2009.66 Thus,
under the 2003 Tax Act, individuals are now taxed at
the same maximum rate of 15 percent on qualified
dividends received and on long-term capital gains on
the sale or exchange of stock.
The alignment of long-term capital gains and divi-
dend rates poses several challenges to the traditional
justifications for the device test. If the government’s
purpose in drafting the device test was to prevent in-
dividual shareholders from converting ordinary in-
come into capital gain, it is unclear whether application
of the device test is necessary when dividend and long-
term capital gains rates are the same. Further, does an
individual shareholder ’s basis in his Distributing or
Controlled shares change that analysis? These ques-
tions are addressed by the following hypothetical ap-
plications of the new rates.
Example 2. Shareholder B owns 100 shares of Dis-
tributing as a capital asset and with a basis of $100. On
July 1, 2003, Distributing conducts a pro rata tax-free
spin-off. Shareholder B receives 100 shares of Con-
trolled stock as a result of the spin-off distribution. The
fair market value of each Distributing and Controlled
share immediately after the distribution is $1. Conse-
quently, Shareholder B allocates his basis in the Dis-
tributing shares among his Distributing and Controlled
shares proportionately and takes a $50 basis in his
Controlled shares and a $50 basis in his Distributing
shares.67 On August 1, 2003, Shareholder B sells his
Controlled shares to a third party for $100 cash. As a
result of the new tax rates, Shareholder B is taxed at a
rate of 15 percent on his long-term capital gain68 of $50
($100 purchase price minus $50 basis) realized on the
sale of the Controlled shares. If, on the other hand,
Shareholder B had been treated as receiving the 100
Controlled shares in a taxable distribution on July 1,
2003, he would have been taxed at a rate of 15 percent
on the full fair market value of these shares — $100 —
as a dividend (assuming Distributing had sufficient
earnings and profits).
It could be argued that application of the device test
to Shareholder B is not necessary because (as a result
of the new tax rates) Shareholder B is taxed at the same
15 percent rate whether he receives the Controlled
shares in a taxable distribution or he sells the shares
after receiving them through a tax-free spin-off. In
either case the danger of earnings and profits bailout
at capital gains rates appears to have been mitigated
because the differential between the dividend and
long-term capital gains rates has been eliminated. For
that reason, during the last period of unified dividend
and long-term capital gains rates, from 1986 to 1990
(Congress eliminated the capital gains preference by
passing the Tax Reform Act of 1986, but reinstated it
four years later69), several commentators argued that
the government should consider suspending applica-
tion of the device test.70 Shareholder B’s ability to
recover a portion of his basis tax free, however, does
not place him in the same position as if he had received
the Controlled shares as a taxable dividend. Had Share-
holder B received the Controlled shares as a taxable
dividend, he would most likely have been taxed on the
full $100 at a rate of 15 percent (total tax liability of
$15); because Shareholder B received the Controlled
shares in a tax-free spin-off and later sold them for
$100, he is taxed on only the long-term capital gain of
$50 at a rate of 15 percent (total tax liability of $7.50).
Although the rate of taxation is the same in either
scenario, the tax-free spin-off enables Shareholder B to
recover his $50 basis in the Controlled shares tax-free.71
65To qualify for the new long-term capital gains rates, the
individual must hold stock in the corporation distributing a
dividend for more than 60 days during the 120-day period
beginning 60 days before the ex-dividend date. Other anti-
abuse provisions also apply. Id., section 302.
66Id., sections 302 and 303.
67Under the applicable Treasury regulation, Shareholder
B’s aggregate basis in his Distributing stock and his Con-
trolled stock equals his aggregate basis in his Distributing
stock held immediately before the spin-off distribution, allo-
cated between his Distributing stock and Controlled stock in
proportion to the fair market value of each. Treas. reg. section
1.358-2(a)(2); sections 358(b)(2) and 358(c).
68Shareholder B “tacks” the holding period of his Dis-
tributing shares to the holding period of his Controlled
shares under section 1223(1).
69See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. Law 99-514, 99th Cong.
2nd Sess. (1986); Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. Law
101-508, 101st Cong. 2nd Sess. (1990).
70 See, e.g., Donald F. Brosnan, “Spin-Offs Before and After
the Tax Reform Act,” 38 Buff. L. Rev. 157 (1990) (“On the
simplest analysis, the repeal of the capital gains preference
renders the prophylactic purpose of section 355 to prevent
bailouts irrelevant. This would suggest elimination of the
nondevice, business purpose and 5-year active business sec-
tions. . . . My second proposed reform would be radical
simplification of section 355 amounting to . . . repeal of sec-
tion 355(a)(1)(B)(the device test)”); see also Karla W. Simon
and Daniel L. Simmons, “The Future of Section 355,” Tax
Notes, July 18, 1988, p. 291 (“Without a capital gain prefer-
ence, the underlying historic purpose behind the ‘device’
restriction . . . of section 355 largely disappears”).
71A shareholder who recovers some amount of basis tax
free through the sale of Controlled shares after their distribu-
tion is not necessarily benefited by tax-free spin-off, rather
than taxable dividend, characterization. For example, assume
the same facts as those in Example 2, except that Distributing
had no current or accumulated earnings and profits at the
time of the spin-off distribution (and after taking into ac-
count any required increase to Distributing’s earnings and
profits that results from the spin-off distribution itself). Char-
acterization of the distribution as a taxable dividend would
have required Shareholder B to reduce his $100 basis in his
Distributing shares to zero (under section 301(c)(2)), result-
ing in Shareholder B’s tax-free recovery of his entire $100
basis. In a tax-free spin-off, however, Shareholder B would
have achieved tax-free recovery of only 50 percent of his $100
basis (which would have been allocated to his Controlled
shares) on the sale of the Controlled shares. Further, even if
Distributing had a small amount of current or accumulated
(Footnote 71 continued on next page.)
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As a result of Shareholder B’s tax-free recovery of
his $50 basis, the Treasury regulations could treat the
spin-off in Example 2 as a device. In 1989 the Treasury
expanded the traditional definition of a device to in-
clude “a transaction that effects a recovery of basis.”72
The government highlighted this provision in its
preamble to the Treasury regulations by commenting
that “[t]he final regulations also make clear that a
device can include a transaction that effects a recovery
of basis.”73 The fact that this language was added in
1989, during a period when ordinary income and cap-
ital gains rates temporarily were equal, suggests that
the Treasury purposefully expanded the device test to
address periods of unified rates. Consequently, the
device test may still be relevant to Example 2, despite
the rate parity, because the use of a tax-free spin-off
enables Shareholder B to recover his $50 basis in his
Controlled shares tax-free on his sale of those shares.
Although this basis recovery enables the govern-
ment to collect only a portion of the tax that it would
have collected had the distribution been a taxable div-
idend, the government may collect the remainder of
Shareholder B’s gain on Shareholder B’s taxable dis-
position of his Distributing shares (in which Share-
holder B also holds a $50 basis). If Shareholder B sells
his Distributing shares (with a basis of $50) for more
than $100, the government could actually collect more
total tax from Shareholder B than it would have col-
lected if the distribution of the Controlled shares was
treated as a taxable dividend.74 The government’s posi-
tion has merit, however, as Shareholder B may never
dispose of his Distributing shares, or may sell them for
less than $100. In either of those situations, the govern-
ment would collect less total tax from Shareholder B
than if it had collected the 15 percent tax on the full
$100 fair market value of the Controlled shares as a
dividend.
It is also interesting to note that even though the
Treasury regulations could treat the transaction in Ex-
ample 2 as a device because of the basis recovery, each
of the “transactions that ordinarily will not be con-
sidered as a device” described in the Treasury regula-
tions could enable a shareholder to recover basis in
distributed Controlled shares tax free by selling the
Controlled shares after the distribution. Arguably, the
government’s policy justifications for these exceptions
outweigh any device factor that could be presented as
a result of basis recovery.
In light of the government’s basis recovery concerns,
there may still be justification for applying the device
test to shareholders who hold some amount of basis in
their Distributing shares, despite the unification of the
rates. Conversely, the new tax rates make application
of the device test unnecessary to a shareholder holding
zero basis in his Distributing shares. Consider the fol-
lowing example:
Example 3. Shareholder C owns 100 Distributing
shares as a capital asset and holds them with a basis
of zero. On September 1, 2003, Distributing conducts a
pro rata tax-free spin-off. Shareholder C receives 100
shares of Controlled stock as a result of the spin-off
distribution. The fair market value of each Distributing
and Controlled share immediately after the distribu-
tion is $1. Because Shareholder C has zero basis in his
Distributing shares, there is no basis to apportion be-
tween his Distributing and Controlled shares.75 On Oc-
tober 1, 2003, Shareholder C sells his Controlled shares
to a third party for $100 cash. As a result of the new
tax rates, Shareholder C is taxed at a rate of 15 percent
on his long-term capital gain76 of $100 ($100 purchase
price minus zero basis) realized on the sale of the Con-
trolled shares. If, however, Shareholder C had been
treated as receiving the 100 Controlled shares in a tax-
able distribution on September 1, 2003, he would have
been taxed at a rate of 15 percent on the full fair market
value of these shares — $100 — as a dividend (assum-
ing Distributing had sufficient earnings and profits)
and would have been taxed at a maximum rate of 15
percent on this amount.
As Shareholder C pays the same total tax whether
he receives the Controlled shares as a taxable dividend
or sells the shares after receiving them in a tax-free
spin-off, application of the device test is difficult to
justify in this scenario. There are several instances in
which a shareholder could hold stock with zero basis:
A shareholder receiving Controlled shares in a tax-free
spin-off could have also received boot in the distribu-
tion, which would require basis reduction (but no cor-
responding basis increase, assuming Distributing had
no current or accumulated earnings and profits at the
time of the distribution);77 a shareholder could have
received distributions on his Distributing shares that
were characterized as return of capital, which would
earnings and profits at the time of the spin-off distribution,
Shareholder B still may have recovered a greater percentage
of his $100 basis had the spin-off been treated as a taxable
dividend instead of a tax-free spin-off. These results may be
additional justification for the Treasury regulations’ provi-
sion that a spin-off will not ordinarily be considered a device
if Distributing has no current or accumulated earnings and
profits at the time of the distribution. Treas. reg. section
1.355-2(d)(5)(ii)(A), (B).
72Treas. reg. section 1.355-2(d)(1).
73Treasury Decision 8238 (Jan. 5, 1989).
74For example, if Shareholder B eventually were to sell his
Distributing shares for $200, Shareholder B would recognize
a long-term capital gain of $150 ($200 purchase price minus
$50 basis). Between his sales of Distributing and Controlled
shares, therefore, Shareholder B would pay a 15 percent tax
on a total of $200 of long-term capital gain ($150 gain on sale
of Distributing shares plus $50 gain on sale of Controlled
shares). In this instance, the government would collect total
tax of $30. If, on the other hand, the government had treated
the distribution on July 1, 2003, as a taxable dividend, it
would have collected total tax of only $15 ($100 dividend tax
at a 15 percent rate).
75See note 67 supra.
76Shareholder C “tacks” the holding period of his Dis-
tributing shares to the holding period of his Controlled
shares under section 1223(1).
77See section 358(a)(1).
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require basis reduction under section 301(c)(2);78 or a
shareholder may have obtained his Distributing shares
originally in a section 351 transfer in exchange for
property subject to liability.79 In Example 3 there is no
opportunity for the conversion of dividend income into
capital gain because the tax rate is the same in both
cases. More importantly, because Shareholder C has
zero basis in his Controlled shares, there is no pos-
sibility of tax-free basis recovery on his disposition of
the shares. Shareholder C does not violate the Treasury
regulations’ cautionary statement that a spin-off can be
a device if it effects recovery of basis. On the contrary,
because Shareholder C has no basis to recover, the gov-
ernment would collect the same $15 of tax from Share-
holder C whether he received the shares as a taxable
dividend or sold them after receiving them in a tax-free
spin-off. The device test therefore does not seem
relevant in a situation involving a shareholder holding
his Distributing or Controlled shares with zero basis.
An argument in favor of retaining the device test
even for a shareholder with zero basis is that the device
test provides the government with a valuable timing
benefit.80 A dividend is taxed currently, whereas a long-
term capital gain realized on the sale of Controlled
shares is not taxed until the disposition of the Con-
trolled shares. Consequently, it could be argued that
even though the government collects the same total tax
in Example 3, whether the transaction is a taxable div-
idend or a tax-free spin-off, the device test should still
be applied. Dividend characterization would allow the
government to collect the $15 of tax on September 1,
2003, while tax-free spin-off characterization would
prevent the government from collecting this amount
until October 1, 2003. The timing argument should be
rejected for several reasons. First, in the vast body of
legislative history of section 355, Congress did not ex-
press concerns about the timing detriments that tax-
free spin-offs pose to the government.81 Rather, it
focused on shareholder attempts to use section 355 to
exploit the ordinary income/capital gains rate differ-
ential. Second, the government has not expressed con-
cern that tax-free spin-offs could delay its receipt of
revenue. The Treasury regulations declare that a device
is evidenced by a quick sale of Controlled shares after
their distribution. The sooner that a sale occurs after a
tax-free spin-off, the greater the evidence of a device.
It would be contradictory for the government to argue
that the device test is necessary because without it,
tax-free spin-off treatment could prolong income
recognition; rather, the government is most troubled
by sales that occur soon after a tax-free distribution.
Those sales result in equally speedy recognition of in-
come by the selling shareholders. Arguably, without
the device test, shareholders would sell their Con-
trolled shares with even greater expedience. The device
test is not necessary to ensure that income recognition
occur in a timely manner.
For the reasons indicated above, the device test
creates unnecessary and onerous burdens for corporate
taxpayers attempting tax-free spin-offs in which Con-
trolled shares are distributed to shareholders with zero
basis. The recently issued Rev. Proc. 2003-48, for ex-
ample, now requires corporate taxpayers seeking spin-
off rulings to represent to the Service that the transac-
tion is not used principally as a device.82 To submit this
representation, these corporate taxpayers typically
seek written confirmation from their large share-
holders that they do not intend to dispose of their
Controlled or Distributing shares after the distribu-
tion.83 As a result of the new tax rates, there does not
appear to be a persuasive justification for that confir-
mation, even from large shareholders, if they hold their
Distributing shares with zero basis. Without this re-
quired representation, however, the Service will refuse
to rule on the tax-free status of a proposed spin-off.
Further, as described previously in Part III, a corpo-
rate taxpayer faces a heightened business purpose stan-
dard if its shareholders plan to sell their Controlled or
Distributing shares after the distribution. The Treasury
regulations provide that evidence of a legitimate cor-
porate business purpose is a factor that can overcome
the presence of those shareholder sales in the analysis
78If Distributing has no current or accumulated earnings
and profits, a distribution of cash or property will be tax-free
to a recipient shareholder until his basis in the corporation’s
stock is reduced to zero. After the shareholder ’s basis is re-
duced to zero, any amount of the distribution in excess of his
basis is taxed as capital gain. Sections 301(c)(2), (3). Thus, it
is possible that a shareholder of Distributing could hold his
Distributing shares with zero basis as a result of those pre-
vious distributions.
79A shareholder must reduce basis in stock received in a
section 351 transfer by the amount of liability assumed by
the transferee corporation. Sections 358(a)(1), (d)(1). For ex-
ample, if a shareholder contributes property in which he
holds a basis of $20,000 — but which is subject to a liability
of $20,000 — to a corporation in a section 351 transfer in
exchange for stock with a fair market value of $100,000, the
shareholder must reduce his basis in the stock received by
$20,000 (the amount of the liability assumed) to zero.
80See Mark J. Silverman, note 58 supra (“[T]he device issue
remains relevant because (1) dividend distributions are taxed
currently while a section 355 transaction is tax free . . . ”).
81See Part III supra for a discussion of Congress’s concerns
leading up to the enactment of the device test.
82The Service caveats in Rev. Proc. 2003-48 that it “will
decline to issue a letter ruling in all cases in which the tax-
payer fails to submit the required representation. The Nation-
al Office will not determine whether the transaction is used
principally as a device for the distribution of earnings and
profits of the distributing corporation, the controlled corpo-
ration, or both.”
83See, e.g., Michael L. Schler, “Simplifying and Rationaliz-
ing the Spinoff Rules,” 56 S.M.U. Law Rev. 239 (Winter 2003).
The author argues that the management of a distributing
corporation with a mutual fund as a large shareholder “will
have no idea whether a fund will even continue to hold its
[distributing corporation] stock until the time of the spin-off,
let alone whether it will sell its [distributing corporation] or
[controlled corporation] stock after the spin-off.” Id. Conse-
quently, “because [distributing corporation] cannot give the
representation required by the IRS without obtaining a rep-
resentation from the fund, the result is to put the fund in the
position of having veto power over a spin-off.” Id.
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of whether a spin-off is a device.84 Thus, a corporate
taxpayer aware of planned distributee shareholder
sales may be forced to produce a stronger, more con-
vincing corporate business purpose for the spin-off. A
corporate taxpayer with zero basis shareholders who
plan to sell their Controlled shares shortly after a spin-
off should not be required to meet a higher business
purpose standard than usual during a period of unified
rates.
V. Alternatives and Solutions
The enactment of unified rates raises significant
questions about the policy behind the device test. In
response to this development, however, the device test
should not be repealed completely. Rather, the govern-
ment should modify its application.
A. Relevance of the Device Test
Although shareholders receiving Controlled shares
in a tax-free spin-off are now subject to the same tax
rate on dividend and long-term capital gain income,
the device test still rests on some solid policy grounds.
First, the Treasury regulations explicitly expanded the
scope of the device test in 1989 by including the
presence of tax-free recovery of basis as evidence of a
device.85 In any scenario in which a distributee share-
holder holds any amount of basis (greater than zero)
in his Controlled shares, a tax-free spin-off invites the
opportunity for tax-free basis recovery. While basis
recovery was not a concern regarding the spin-off pro-
visions voiced by the Gregory Court or Congress, the
Treasury made this factor part of the device test under
its legislative grant of authority to write regulations
interpreting the code’s provisions.86 It is a well-settled
principle that “[t]reasury regulations and interpreta-
tions long continued without substantial changes, ap-
plying to unamended or substantially reenacted
statutes, are deemed to have received congressional
approval and have the effect of law.”87 Perhaps the
government could modify its approach during this
period of unified rates by ruling that the greater the
amount of basis recovered, the greater the evidence of
a device. Second, the device test should not be repealed
completely because the unified 15 percent tax rate on
dividend and long-term capital gain income is
scheduled to sunset on January 1, 2009.88 Although
Congress may extend the current term of the new rates,
it is equally possible that the new rates will expire,
reinstating the differential between dividend and long-
term capital gain rates. In that event, the device test
will once again be necessary to prevent abusive use of
the tax-free spin-off provisions to convert dividend in-
come into capital gain.
Application of the device test to distributee share-
holders who hold their Distributing and Controlled
shares with zero basis is not necessary, however, given
the government’s policy concerns. As Example 3 above
demonstrates, in a zero basis scenario, a distributee
shareholder with zero basis in his Distributing shares
may be in the same tax position whether the distribu-
tion of Controlled shares is treated as a taxable divi-
dend or a tax-free spin-off. This scenario creates no
opportunity for tax-free basis recovery because there
is zero basis for shareholders to recover. Consequently,
the government should indicate that the sale of Dis-
tributing or Controlled shares after a tax-free spin-off
by a zero basis shareholder is not evidence of a device.
B. Taxpayer Guidance
A practical and effective solution could be an inser-
tion in Treasury reg. section 1.355-2(d)(5), “Transac-
tions ordinarily not considered as a device.”  As
described previously, that provision discusses transac-
tions that would result in capital gain treatment to a
distributee shareholder regardless of whether distribu-
tion of the Controlled shares is treated as a tax-free
spin-off. Similarly, a distribution of Controlled shares
to a zero-basis shareholder results in the taxation of the
full amount of the distribution or sale (assuming ade-
quate holding periods) at a maximum rate of 15 per-
cent. The “transactions ordinarily not considered as a
device” provisions (Treasury reg. section 1.355-2(d)(5))
could be revised to include the following:
(v) Zero basis. A distribution occurring on or
after May 6, 2003, and before January 1, 2009, is
ordinarily considered not to have been used prin-
cipally as a device with respect to an individual
shareholder if such shareholder ’s basis in its
stock of the distributing corporation making such
distribution is zero at the time of such distribu-
tion.
An insertion along these lines would carve out the
distribution to zero-basis shareholders from device
treatment and would limit the effective term for this
provision to the current term of unified rates. The
proposed insertion is not the only means of addressing
the zero basis issue. An introductory sentence of Trea-
sury reg. section 1.355-2(d)(1), which now reads, “A
device can include a transaction that effects a recovery
of basis,” could be followed by language to this effect:
“A distribution to an individual shareholder who holds
a basis of zero in its stock in the distributing corpora-
tion is not such a transaction.”
84See Treas. reg. section 1.355-2(d)(3), which provides that
“[t]he corporate business purpose for the transaction is
evidence of nondevice. The stronger the evidence of device
. . . the stronger the corporate business purpose required to
prevent the determination that the transaction was used prin-
cipally as a device.”
85See Part IV supra for further discussion of this expansion
of the device test.
86See section 7805(a) (“ . . . the Secretary shall prescribe all
needful rules and regulations as may be necessary by reason
of any alteration of law in relation to internal revenue”).
87Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938).
88The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2003, Pub. Law 108-27, 108th Cong. 1st Sess. (2003), section
303.
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In addition, the Service could issue taxpayer
guidance signaling that the device test will be enforced
less strictly during the period of unified rates. That
taxpayer guidance could appear in the form of a formal
IRS notice announcing that in light of recent legislative
changes, the government’s concerns about the use of
tax-free spin-offs as devices have lessened significantly
and that until 2009, only in the most egregious cases
(for example, involving distributions to shareholders
with very high basis in their Distributing stock) will
the government enforce the device test.
There is precedent for such government action. After
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 repealed the capital gains
rate differential,89 the Service announced that applica-
tion of section 1248(e) would be suspended during
periods when there is no capital gains preference.
Under section 1248(a), any gain realized by a U.S.
shareholder on the disposition of the stock of a con-
trolled foreign corporation (CFC) is treated as dividend
income, rather than capital gain, to the extent of the
CFC’s earnings and profits (other than those pre-
viously included in the U.S. shareholder ’s income
under subpart F).90 Section 1248(e) was enacted as an
antiabuse mechanism. The section provides that when
a taxpayer sells the stock of a domestic corporation that
was “formed or availed of” principally for holding,
directly or indirectly, the stock of a CFC, the U.S. share-
holder is treated as if it sold the stock of the CFC
directly and must report the gain as dividend income.91
In 1987 the Service issued Notice 87-64,92 announcing
that regulations would be issued suspending the ap-
plication of section 1248(e) “for periods during which
there is no capital gain differential in the code.”93 The
notice explained that “the repeal of the capital gains
rate differential eliminate[d] the need for section
1248(e).”94 Contrary to the Service’s characterization,
repeal of section 1248(e) had significant adverse tax
consequences for taxpayers. Application of section
1248(e) could have permitted a U.S. shareholder to off-
set foreign tax credits against the gain recognized on
the sale or exchange of the domestic corporation’s stock
(because deemed dividends under section 1248 carry
indirect foreign tax credits).95 As one commentator
noted, “The suspension of section 1248(e) not only is
far from neutral in effect, but can produce significant
anti-taxpayer results.”96
The government’s temporary retirement of section
1248(e) should be viewed as analogous to the suspen-
sion of the device test’s application. The government,
in its treatment of section 1248(e), used the unification
of capital gains and dividend rates to justify its
decision to suspend the availability of a provision that
could provide a benefit to taxpayers. It should also
consider suspending the application of the device test,
which could pose an obstacle to taxpayers, in some
situations described in this article.
By requiring that taxpayers submit a
broad device representation as a
prerequisite to receiving a ruling, Rev.
Proc. 2003-48 sets the device bar
higher at a time when it should be
lowered.
Last, rather than require an all-encompassing device
representation (such as that required by Rev. Proc.
2003-48) from taxpayers requesting tax-free spin-off
rulings, the Service could outline scenarios in which
that taxpayer representation is not needed. In the “no
ruling” environment that Rev. Proc. 2003-48 creates,
any taxpayer guidance regarding tax-free spin-offs is
of critical importance. By requiring that taxpayers sub-
mit such a broad device representation as a prereq-
uisite to receiving a ruling, Rev. Proc. 2003-48 does not
provide that guidance and instead sets the device bar
higher at a time when it should be lowered.
C. The Section 355(e) Alternative
The government could also look to section 355(e) as
a viable alternative to the device test. That section
causes a spin-off to be taxable if it occurs pursuant to
a plan under which the spin-off is followed by the
acquisition of a 50-percent-or-greater interest in either
Distributing or Controlled.97 If the government limits
application of the device test as a result of the rate
unification, it still can deter significant dispositions of
either Distributing or Controlled stock that occur after
a tax-free spin-off. Although tax-free spin-offs followed
by prearranged acquisitions do not present conversion
opportunities, they do present an opportunity for tax-
payers to avoid corporate-level tax on appreciation in-
herent in distributed Controlled stock. That potential
abuse should motivate the government to focus on sec-
tion 355(e) rather than the device test.
While the device test is aimed at preventing share-
holders’ conversion attempts, section 355(e) is de-
signed to prevent corporate-level appreciation from es-
caping taxation. Under this section, a spin-off that
89See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. Law 99-514, 99th Cong.
2nd Sess. (1986), sections 301(a) and 311.
90Section 1248(a) (flush language).
91Section 1248(e).
92Notice 87-64, 1987-2 C.B. 375.
93Id. Although the notice provides that the regulations
would be effective as of September 21, 1987, no regulations
were issued.
94Id.
95For discussion of the mechanics of section 1248, see
Lowell D. Yoder, “Section 1248: Taxation of the Disposition
of Stock of a CFC,” Tax Strategies for Corporate Acquisitions,
Dispositions, Spin-Offs, Joint Ventures, Financings, Reorganiza-
tions & Restructurings 2002, 549 PLI/Tax 527 (Oct.-Nov. 2002).
96James P. Fuller, “U.S. Tax Consequences of International
Acquisitions,” Tax Strategies for Corporate Acquisitions, Disposi-
tions, Spin-Offs, Joint Ventures, Financings, Reorganizations &
Restructurings 2001, 514 PLI/Tax 665 (Oct.-Nov. 2001).
97Section 355(e)(2)(A)(ii).
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occurs pursuant to a “plan or (series of related trans-
actions)” designed to enable one or more persons to
acquire, directly or indirectly, a 50-percent-or-greater
stock interest (measured by vote or value) in either
Distributing or Controlled is taxable to Distributing
(but not to Distributing’s shareholders).98 The code
provides a rebuttable presumption that the spin-off
was part of a plan if the acquisitions occur within the
two-year period before and after the spin-off.99 In other
words, section 355(e) imposes a corporate-level tax on
any gain that Distributing would have otherwise recog-
nized as a result of the distribution of Controlled
shares. In 2001 the Treasury issued temporary regula-
tions providing safe harbors that, if satisfied, shorten
the period during which the acquisition of Distributing
or Controlled automatically will be presumed to be
part of a plan.100
The mechanics of section 355(e) so
closely resemble those of the device
test that the government should
consider relying on this provision
rather than the device test during a
period of unified rates.
The mechanics of section 355(e) so closely resemble
those of the device test that the government should
consider relying on this provision rather than the
device test during a period of unified rates. Section
355(e) considers a subsequent acquisition to be part of
a plan, just as the device test treats a subsequent sale
or exchange as evidence of a device. The importance
of negotiations or arrangements before a spin-off under
section 355(e) is similar to that of pre-arranged sales as
a device factor under the device test. Both provisions
also adopt a “facts and circumstances” approach.
The availability of section 355(e) as an alternative
mechanism for deterring large dispositions of Con-
trolled or Distributing shares should further persuade
the government to limit application of the device test.
Unification of the rates does not reduce corporate-level
incentives for avoiding tax liability on appreciation in
Controlled shares (in spite of the General Utilities
repeal).101 Increased reliance on section 355(e) therefore
should be considered.
D. Future Treasury Study
In addition to the suggestions described above, the
Treasury and the Service should commit to examine,
and seek taxpayer comments regarding, the relevance
of the device test during a period of unified rates.102
Not only would a study prove useful in addressing the
role of the device test during the current period of
unified rates, but it also would be relevant to any other
future period in which Congress equalizes the maxi-
mum tax rates on dividends and long-term capital
gains.
VI. Conclusion
The unification of individual dividend and long-
term capital gains rates shakes the policy foundation
of the device test. In response to questions about the
current and future relevance of the device test, this
article contends that the device test should not be
repealed completely because, among other reasons, a
shareholder receiving Controlled shares in a tax-free
spin-off can still recover his basis tax free. The ap-
plicable Treasury regulations expressly describe basis
recovery as a possible device factor. Given that basis
recovery is now the only major difference between a
taxable dividend and a tax-free spin-off, however, the
government should consider limiting its enforcement
of the device test, especially for individual share-
holders with zero basis in their Distributing and Con-
trolled shares who pose no risk of basis recovery. The
government should consider these issues in determin-
ing whether continued application of the device test
during a period of unified rates is sound policy.
98Id.
99Section 355(e)(2)(B).
100The applicable Treasury regulations provide several
safe harbors under which a spin-off and subsequent acquisi-
tion will not be treated as part of a single plan. For example,
a spin-off and subsequent acquisition are not considered part
of a single plan if “the acquisition occurred more than 6
months after the distribution and there was no agreement,
understanding, arrangement, or substantial negotiations con-
cerning the acquisition or a similar acquisition during the
period that begins 1 year before the distribution and ends 6
months thereafter” and the spin-off is motivated by a corpo-
rate business purpose other than to facilitate an acquisition.
Treas. reg. section 1.355-7T(d)(1)(ii).
101See Deborah L. Paul, “Triple Taxation,” 56 Tax Law. 571
(2003) regarding the purpose of section 355(e) (“The enact-
ment of section 355(e), like the repeal of General Utilities, ap-
pears to be an effort to make the corporate tax regime inter-
nally consistent. Repeal of General Utilities made sense on the
view that if sales by a corporation of its assets . . . are taxed,
then distributions of corporate assets should also be taxed.
Section 355(e) makes sense on the view that if a sale of sub-
sidiary stock is taxed, then a spin-off followed by a planned
sale should also be taxed”).
102The Treasury could note in its annual Priority Guidance
Plan, for example, that it plans to examine this issue and
possibly release taxpayer guidance regarding its findings.
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